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I

I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate of
LESTER R. THORLEY, deceased

THOMAS J. THORLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant

-vsWILLIAM R. THORLEY,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Case No. 15350

Defendant-Respondent

*******************
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a Will Contest but there was never any trial of
the contest below.

Instead, this case consists of a series of

rulings and orders of the lower court, a domiciliary trial below but
which is not be specifically appealed or included in the Record,
and a final judgment admitting the will to probate without contest.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On the different matters appealed, the Court ruled with the
Respondent .
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant-Respondent requests affirmance of the lower
Court's Orders and Judgments being appealed.
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-2STATEMENT OF FACTS
As a word of explanation, the Clerk of the lower Court r"
not numbered the pages of the Record consecutively but has d~ij
the record into that part designated by the Appellant and

that~
r·

designated by the Respondent.

The documents designated by the

Appellant have been numbered 1 to 26 and the documents designate:
by the Respondent numbered from 1 to 11.

Reference to the Recorci

this brief will refer to the Appellant's Designation or Respondec:
Designation, as the case may be by the number of document which;,
consecutive.
The "Introduction" and Statement of Facts set forth int:.

Appellant's brief contain so many statements of "fact" which are~
included any where in the Record on Appeal,it is felt that

t~~

ent should set forth the facts in complete detail insofar as dis1
by the uncontroverted pleadings, rulings, orders and Findings anc

!
I

Judgments below.

There will be no attempt here to try to get beil

this Court many matters which are simply not disclosed in the Re: 1
such as accusations of wrong doing on the part of the Proponent(:
the Will, who is the Respondent, the type of man the decedent wa!
intimations he was easily led and influenced by a greedy brother·
could or did perpetrate a fraud.

There is absolutely nothing in

Record as to these accusations and they reveal a wild attempt to'
before this Court claims of fraud and undue influence which Appe:
only hoped he could prove but which he chose not to present to c
Court below. These stacements are contained in the last Paragr''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1

-32 of the brief and again the second paragraph of page 16 of Appellant's brief.

Ml.at he sought or hoped to accomplish by this

recitation of so-called facts is not known and they can be dismissed
by a reminder that they are shown at no place in the Record on

Appeal.
This case was never tried on the merits and the one trial
held, that on the one question of the domicile of the decedent, is
actually not appealed by the Appellant and there is no transcript
of this four day jury trial.

Since these

proceedings have con-

tinued over a period of almost two years and the Record discloses
numerous orders, motions, continuances, Findings and Judgments,
the Respondent will attempt to set forth what happened below as
disclosed by the Record on Appeal.
The decedent died at Cedar City, Utah on December 21, 1975
and was at the time of his death, a resident of Cedar City, Utah.
On December 29, 1975 a petition for the probate of his last Will
and Testament, executed May 19, 1975, was filed.

This will left

the entire estate of decedent to the Respondent herein, William R.
Thorley, a brother of decedent, as decedent had never married and
had no children or family.

Another brother, the Appellant, filed

a contest to this Will and also filed a petition for the probate
of an earlier will of decedent, in the
County, California.

Superior Court of San Diego

The decedent had lived in Iron County for ap-

proximately the first fifty years of his life but then had moved to
:,u1

Diego County, California where he had lived for almost thirty
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years before moving back to

Cedar City where he lived seven months

-4before his death.

The entire estate, consisting of real prope:1

in Iron County and also savings accounts in savings institutio:
in California, has its situs in Iron County as decedent was do:
iciled in this County at his death.
The probate petition filed was set for hearing for two d
ferent times and each time vacated at the request of counselfu
Appellant.

It was set a third time for April 8, 1976 and althcj

counsel for Appellant again requested that the setting be

vacat~
I

the Court refused to do so whereupon Appellant dismissed his coi
without prejudice.

The Proponent of said will, who is

Respond~

herein, then made proof on the will and it was admitted to pro~j
upon full Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment,!
(Nos. 2 and 3, Respondent's Designation of Record).

Approximat:!

six months later, the same conteE.tant filed a new contest underj
I
I

Section 75-3-12 of the Utah Probate Code.
Since the proceedings filed in San Diego County by the
i

Appellant claimed the residence of the decedent at li.is death to,
be San Diego County and since the contest filed in Iron County,

Utah claimed the residence to be either Iron County .QE__San Diei11
County, California, Respondent herein moved the Court for a Pre:f

i

inary hearing or trial to determine this question of resi~~eq
I
domicile as it was felt to be jurisdictional. The Appellant re"
quested a jury trial.

.al on tr,i
The Court t h ereupon set the trl

issue of domicile for December 9, 1976 which setting was vacat
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-5at the request of counsel for the Appellant.

It was next set for

January 26, 1977 and again vacated at the request of counsel for
Appellant.

The domiciliary trial and also the trial of the Will

contest on the merits were then set for March 9, 1977, with the
domiciliary trial to be before an advisory jury.

Appellant again

requested that this setting be vacated which was resisted by Respondent.

However, due to the Judge becoming incapacitated, nec-

essitating the calling in of a judge Pro Tern, who declined to hear
the case,

the setting was vacated.

The domiciliary trial was then

set for May 23, 1977 before a jury, to be followed by the jury trial
on the merits in the event the domicile had been found to be Iron
County, Utah.
The domiciliary trial was held between May 23 and May 27,
1977.

Special Interrogatories were submitted to the jury on the

question of residence or domicile and the jury found the domicile
of decedent to have been Cedar City, Iron County, Utah at the time
of his death on December 21, 1975 and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment were entered by the Court, approving and
accepting the findings of the Jury( Nos, 17 and 18 Appellant's
Designation of Record).

This domiciliary trial was never appealed

and there is no transcript of this trial.
At the conclusion of the domiciliary trial, the Appellant
requested a one month continuance of the trial on the merits in
nrJpr to prepare for trial, arrange for his witnesses who were in
the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
CaliforniaSponsored
and by also
soServices
that
he could
take
anStateInterlocutory
Appeal
Library
and Technology
Act, administered
by the Utah
Library.
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-6to this Court.

This request was granted by the trial Judge as

felt that that iury should not try the case on the merits andG
setting was vacated, to be re-set in approximately one month so.
to give time to Appellant to arrange to have his witneses preser.:
and so that he could take is Interlocutory Appeal.
On or about June 1, 1977 the lower

~ourt

notified all Uti

counsel for both the Appellant and Respondent that the case woul:
be set for iury trial on June 28, 1977.

Utah counsel for Appell,

Michael W. Park, acknowledged that he had received notice of thi:I
setting and that he had notified
Designation of
ings).

California counsel, (Respondenti

Record No. 9, Transcript of June 28, 1977 proceec·1

Formal written notice of the trial setting was

given~

'I

all parties on June 17, 1977.
On June 28, 1977 all counsel appeared.

Counsel for Appe:.

lant then moved for a Stay so as to permit the Superior Court of
San Diego County to proceed to hear the case or for a change of
venue, and also for a two weeks continuance.

These motions were

denied and the jury trial re-set for the following morning, June.
However, counsel for the Appellant informed the Court they were rl
ready to try the case and would not even appear on June 29~. ~

1

Appellant and his counsel did not appear on June 29th, the jury "
dismissed and the Court heard the testimony of the Proponent anc
again admitted the Will to probate and dismissed the contest w~
prejudice and again entered complete Findings and Conclusioo 5 r
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-7Judgment on June 29, 1977(No. 24 of Appellant's Designation and
No. 10 of Respondent's Designation of Record.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE
TRIAL COURT IN REFUSING A FURTHER CONTINUANCE OF THE TRIAL SETTING.
'Ihe many settings of this case below, totalling eight and
the many continuances have been set forth in the

Statement of

Facts to show there was no abuse of discretion in refusing a Ninth
continuance.

All these different settings and continuances are

set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered
June 29, 1977( No. 10 of Respondent's Designation of Record.)
It is little wonder 1th.at the Court on June 28, 1977 refused
another two week continuance.

In fact it would have been an abuse

of discretion for the Court to have done so.

'Ihe setting for June

28, 1977 was the eighth setting and 27 days notice was given, not
ten or less as Appellant now claims.

Claims of the Appellant that

he needed this additional time to arrange for his witnesses are
ridiculous in the light of the many prior settings for which the
witnesses should have been ready.

Claims of the Appellant that he

did not have sufficient time because this Court did not rule on his
petition for Interlocutory Appeal until June 27th are without merit.
The domiciliary trial had concluded on May 28th and yet Appellant
waited until June 17, 1977 to file his petition for Interlocutory
Appeal.

He gives no reason why he could not have taken this sooner.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Interlocutory Appeals under
our practice
are not as a matter of right

-8and are sparingly given.

The hope that this Court would enter: j

this appeal could only have been a false hope or faint one
and for

at~

Appellant to now say that he was not ready to try the

11

because of his petition for Interlocutory Appeal is a weak excu!
at best.

Interlocutory Appeals in Utah are only gnmted where

there is a decisive issue presented which could lay to rest

t~

entire case without the necessity for a trial as pointed out in
Manwill vs. Oyler, 361 Pac.2dfl7(l.Jt).In fact Rule 72(b) providin1.
for Interlocuatory Appeals provides that substantial rights mustl
be involved which will materially affect the decision.
that this

The fact'

I

Court did refuse to entertain the Interlocutory Appea:i

shows that the matters appealed were not considered decisive.

Thj

Appellant souglt to have reviewed three Orders of the trial court,i

(1) Refusal to stay proceedings on the ground of Comity and
Non Conveniens

I

For~!·

and defer to the Superior Court of San Diego Gour

i
California, (2) Refusal to change the venue and (3) Refusal to '
order a psychiatric examination of the Proponent of the Will, th1
Respondent herein.

It is submitted that none of these had merit

even for a final appeal, let alone an Interlocutory appeal. As:i
I

(1), an Iron County jury had already found that domicile of the I

decedent was Cedar City, Utah and for the lower court to have i>'i

I

'<

a Stay order of the proceedings below and deferred to the Supet1·1
Court of

San Diego County would have been not only a serious M

of discretion, it would have been out-right error.

As to (2) :

change of venue on the showing made was not called for and as r
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Furthermore, a c:f

t

-9-

of venue is a discretionery matter and it most certainly would not
be

a

decisive matter

Interlocutory Appeal.

an~ay

which this court would entertain on

As to (l), the refusal to order a psych-

iatric examinPtion of the Proponent of the Will most certainly
was

proper

under Rule 35(a) of our Rules of Procedure which

provides in pertinent part "when the mental or physical condition
....•• of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is
pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician ••••••••••.• "

But the mental and physical

condition of the Proponent of the will, William
never in controversy.

R. Thorrley, was

True the mental condition of the decedent was

at issue and in controversy but not the proponent of the will.
Furthermore, under the Utah case of

Stone vs. Stone, 431 Pac.2d 802,

this is a discretionary matter and there was no merit to this point
on appeal, final or Interlocutory.
It was a mis-placed hope that this Court would grant the
Interlocutory Appeal and the Appellant should have been

ready to

try the case in any event.
As stated above, the setting for June 28, 1977 was actually
made on June 1, 1977 and counsel for Appellant notified.

No motion

for a continuance was filed but only an oral motion made on the day
set for trial.

Rule 40(b) of our Rules of Procedure provides that

"Upon motion of a party, the Court may it its discretion .... postpone
·' rria 1 or proceeding upon good cause shown."

In First Security

Bank vs. Johnson,
Pac.2d
52l(Utah)
case
hadandbeen
procedurally
Sponsored by the S.J. 540
Quinney Law
Library. Funding
for digitization providedthe
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-10delayed for tYJo and half years by interrogatories and various

i

motions and this Court held that a motion for continuar.ce filed
nine days before the trial setting, did not justify a

continuan:

From this short opinion, it YJould indicate that the long seriesi
delays, motions, interrogatories and rulings is someYJhat compara'i
to the record in this case.

Furthermore, Appellant admits in hii

brief that he had depositions of all his YJitnesses, except possill
one expert YJitness and there should have been no difficulty gett'
this testimony from his California YJitnesses received.

Appellant:

I

cites the Utah case of Bairas vs. Johnson, 373 Pac. 2d 375 in

support of his motion for a continuance but this case is of no r.1!
as in that case the plaintiff, YJho YJas an indispensable witness :t
himself, did not knoYJ until tYJo days before the trial setting

t~1:

his health YJould prevent him from attending trial and the Courti.
that under these conditions, a continuance should have been grant!

I

POINT I I

I
I

THE APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A
CHANGE OF VENUE.
On or about June 10, 1977 and after the domiciliary trial,I
the Appellant filed a motion for a change of venue, supported bi
Points and Authorities.

The claim YJas that true Respondent heret
1

YJas prominent, YJas YJell knoYJn in the community, had many financi j
connections and YJas a life time resident, YJhereas the Contestant!
w=1s a resident of California although born and raised in Cedar
that a jury YJould probably be influenced to the point
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

his favor.

Of

bias;

The Court denied the motion to <.:hange the venue on I

-11-

June 28, 1977 and on June 29th entered the final decree in this
case.

Some time afterward, the Appellant secured and filed in

the lower court three affidavits in support of the motion for a
change of venue but which motion had already been denied, one from
an Ione Bonzo, one from Ada W. Thorley and one from a John Rowberry.
These affidavits were not on file and were not considered by the
Court below when ruling upon the motion for a change of

venue.

However, when the Appellant filed his designation of Record below,
he also filed these affidavits and included them in his Designation
of Record.

However, the court below made an

express Order on

September 15, 1977(Supplemental Record on Appeal) excluding these
affidavits from the Record on Appeal for the reason they had not
been filed so they could be considered by the lower court in its
considerations of the motion for a change of venue.

Therefore, we

have a situation where nothing but the motion and points and authorities was submitted in support of the motion for a change of venue.
Under the ruling of this court in

C. R. Owens Trucking Corp. vs.

Stewart, 509 Pac,2d 82l(Utah) the court was not obliged to change
the venue based only upon the assertion that the other party would
be well known to jurors in the county, particularly where the court
in the jury selection process excluded any one indicating any bias
or prejudice .

It is submitted the Court could have done the same

in this case.
But even if the motion for a change of venue had been supPorted by the claimed affidavits, this court has ruled that promSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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inence of or acquaintance with a party does not amount to such bias

-12-

I

that gives "reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be

i

had in the county, city or precinct designated in the complaint"
to use the language of Section 78-13-9 Utah Code, pertaining to'
causes for change of venue.

& Tibbetts,

The Utah case of

Chamblee vs. Stoc:
d~

344 Pac. 2d 980 held that it was not an abuse of

cretion to deny a change of venue based on the fact that the de·
fendant was an elected

official, that he was a member of one ofl

oldest families in the county and that he had many friends in tn;ll
county.

This court in the Chamblee case stated as follows:

.

"It would not be consonant with our traditional ~udicial
procedures or· complimentary to our jury sys te111 to deny
a man trial by his neighbors because he happens to be
an official and had friends and relatives in the co~
rnunity."
Likewise, the Owens Trucking case, supra, held that the reputath
of or acquaintance with a party was not ground for a change of
Also in the Bairis case, supra, one of the parties ~dff

venue.

a motion for a change of venue based upon a petition signed bya
number of local residents to the effect that many people in the
i

community had formed an opinion on a vital fact and that it woulc

1

be difficult to get a fair and impartial trial but this Court he:
that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
change.

'Illis Court further stated that change

8

of venue was

discretionary matter and that there would have to be an abuse
that discretion before this
Also the case of

oil

Court would over-turn the lower co~I

!

Winters vs. Turner, 2 78 Pac. 816 (Utah) held
'

that

change of venue was a discretionary matter and an abuse i. i

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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nothing in the way of affidavits or evidence, how could it now be
said that the lower court abused its discretion?

For the Supreme

Court to do so it must give weight and consideration and credence
to matters which were not even before the lower court.
POINT III
THE JURY TRIAL HELD BELOW ON THE QUESTION
OF DOMICILE ACCORDED APPELLANT ALL RIGHTS
TO WHICH HE WAS ENTITLED.
In the Appellant's Notice of Appeal, he states he is appealing from (1) the Order of the lower court refusing to stay the
proceedings or in the alternative, refusal to change the venue and
(2) Failure to grant a two week continuance of the trial and (3)
the final

Decree and Findings and

Conclusions of June 29, 1977.

He mentioned nothing about Point III in Appellant's brief wherein
he now complains that the court below should have granted a regular
jury trial on the question of domicile and not an advisory jury.
It should be noted that the Appellant is not appealing this domiciliary trial and there is no transcript of this four day jury
trial.

This matter was concluded June 3, 1977 by the Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment which were never
appealed and are now final.

But the Appellant is now attempting

to attack these findings through the "back door" by claiming that

he~s not granted a jury trial but only an advisory jury.

It is

true that when the Court originally granted the jury trial on the
question of domicile, he called for an advisory jury, presumably on

the ground that the

Court considered this was a jurisdictional matter

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to be found by the court.

However, it is clear from the proceedings

-14below,(Supplemental Record, Transc. of the May 23, 1977 proceed!
and~

that the court at least treated the jury as a regular jury
an advisory jury.

From this transcript of these proceedings, t·,

trial judge made it clear that the Appellant was getting what he
had asked for, a jury to find upon the question of domicile or
residence of the decedent, upon full and complete instructions,
The Findings and conclusions and Judgment(Nos. 17 and 18 of Appei

I

lant' s Designation of Record) show that the matter was submitteol
to the jury on special interrogatories upon which the jury founol
I

domicile to be in Iron County.

It is submitted that since

th~

made this finding, it would make no difference whether they 1me
acting as an advisory jury or as a regular jury.
Furthermore, the trial judge accepted the jury finding an:
entered judgment pursuant therewith.

The only difference

bet~ee:

regular jury and an advisory jury is that the court need not

aCCi

their "advice" or be bound by i t if the court feels the jury fine
was against the evidence.

But so long as the court does accept

the finding of the jury, then there is no difference.
had found domicile in

If t~J~

California and yet the trial judge had fel

it was against the evidence and ruled otherwise, then the Appell'
would have cause to complain, but nut in this case.

i

The Appellant at no time or place has shown or claimed

th'I

I

· n
he was in any way prejudiced by trying this case to an a'i viso'
/

jury, if in fact it was one.

He has not shown how he would

tried
the case any differently or that he was deprived
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or that he could have tried the case any more favorably than he
did.

The appellant's claim that he was deprived of a valuable

right just because the court initially ordered that the

case be

tried before an advisory jury just does not have merit.
CONCLUSION
The re-counting of the many settings and continuances,
delays, motions and hearings, spanning over a period of two years,
should indicate that the Appellant has never been really serious
about trying this case in Iron County, Utah.

As alluded to in many

places in the Record, there has been a parallel probate proceeding
in San Diego County,

California.

The reason the Appellant has

never been ready or willing to try the case in Utah has been because he has been trying desperately to get the
first

in California.

case to trial

It has been a "race to judgment" situation

where Appellant has been extremely diligent in trying to get the
case to trial in California and yet has used every device, delay,
continuance, motion, hearing and appeal and excuse to head off-a trial
in Iron County, hoping he would have a more

favorable climate in

San Diego County, California.
It should be abundantly clear that there is no merit to this
appeal.

The lower court could well have despaired at ever getting

this case tried and concluded.

After the many continuances granted,

there was no abuse of discretion in the refusal to grant a ninth
continuance, particularly where the Appellant had had more than
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a continuance until the morning the trial was to commence.

The

last continuance granted was for the purpose of gh-ing Appellant
time to arrange to have his witnesses present and
trial and to take an Interlocutory Appeal.

prepare for

Therefore, he had a

time to be ready and he also took his Interlocutory appeal.
Refusal of the court to change the venue was not an abuse
of discretion upon the showing made by the Appellant.
of this Court establish the rule, in any event, that mere a:quain
with or prominence of a party or witness, particularly in ourr
counties in Utah, do not sho\ol bias or that a fair and impartial
trial cannot be had where the trial judge has an opportunity to
careful in his jury selection process so as to eliminate all pos
bias.
Finally, the jury in the domiciliary trial made its findi
the same \-Jay, \olhether it be a regular jury or an advisory jury
these

findings \-Jere expressly approved and accepted by the trial

court and a judgment entered thereon and the Appellant has made
showing that he \-las in any \-Jay prejudiced.
Dated this 23rd

day of January, 1978

Isom
Attorney for
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